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Abstract. Salience, which can be broadly understood as the importance actors attribute to a 
political matter, is a key concept in political science. It has been shown to affect diverse 
matters such as the behaviour of interest groups and decision-makers in concrete policy-
making processes as well as citizen attitudes and their voting behaviour. However, quite 
regularly salience is differently conceptualized and operationalized within and between 
different political science subfields, which raises questions of theoretical (non-) 
complementarity and conceptual boundaries as well as of measurement validity.  In this paper 
we review how salience is conceptualized and measured in studies on public opinion, interest 
groups, political communication and EU legislative policy-making. Empirically, we probe the 
(non-) complementarity of different conceptualizations with original data on EU legislative 
policymaking. To do so, we draw on datasets developed in a large project on EU interest 
group politics (INTEREURO). For a sample of 125 legislative processes initiated by the 
European Commission (between 2008 and 2010) we combine evidence on salience collected 
through in-depth analyses of five media-outlets and interviews with 70 Commission experts 
as well as with 143 interest group representatives.  
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Introduction 
Salience, which can be broadly understood as the importance actors attribute to a 
political matter, is a key concept in political science. It has been shown to affect diverse 
matters such as the behaviour of interest groups, the potential impact of lobbyists, the types of 
interests that mobilize and the interaction among policymakers in concrete policy-making 
processes. In addition, it is argued that salience affects citizen attitudes, informs their voting 
behaviour as well as how political parties campaign on different issues. However, quite 
regularly salience is differently conceptualized and operationalized within and between 
different political science subfields, which leads to inconsistencies when drawing empirical 
and theoretical conclusions from our research. Relying on different EU literatures, this paper 
provides a conceptual discussion of salience and empirically investigates to which extent and 
in which way the different dimensions of the concept which we will map below are 
empirically related.  
The paper is an attempt to clarify the concept and to develop an empirically grounded 
approach which might help us to measure different dimensions of salience. In the following, 
we first review how different EU literatures – more precisely studies of public opinion and 
voting, interest groups, media and decision-making in the EU – conceptualize salience. In the 
second part, we build on this review to point at the complex definitional nature of the concept. 
We stress that it is important to disentangle between individual and collective salience, and 
between salience for citizens, salience for interest groups and salience for policy-makers. 
Moreover, we emphasize the fact that while salience is largely a cognitive concept, most 
studies that have salience as one of their key concepts rely on behavioural measures in order 
to operationalize this concept. Using the examples of conflict and media attention, we discuss 
why this is problematic. Finally, we call attention to the dynamic nature of salience. Salience 
is not only a predictor of political behaviour; it is also affected and shaped by political 
behaviour.  
In the third part of the paper, we develop an empirical account of salience by drawing 
on datasets developed in a large project on EU interest group politics (INTEREURO).1 For a 
sample of 125 legislative processes initiated by the European Commission (between 2008 and 
2010) we combine evidence on salience collected through in-depth analyses of five media-
outlets and interviews with 70 Commission experts as well as with 143 interest group 
representatives. These data allow us to explore empirically to which extent salience for 
various actors are systematically related or independent of each other. 
                                                          
1 See Beyers et al. 2014 and www.intereuro.eu.  
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Salience in EU politics and policy-making: the state of the art 
Salience is a key concept in several distinct literatures on EU politics and policy-
making. It plays a key role in studies of public opinion and voting in the EU. Early on, some 
studies suggested that EU policies are bound to be of low salience to citizens (Moravcsik 
2002). According to this argument, some policy areas (education, health care, pensions, 
taxation and so on) intrinsically are of higher salience to citizens than other policy areas. 
Since EU competences for these policy areas are limited, the EU as such and its policies are 
thought to be of little importance to citizens. More recently, several studies challenged this 
static perspective on the salience of EU policies and politics by stressing that competing elites 
can try to increase or limit the salience of EU issues to citizens and in elections. De Vries 
(2007), for example, focuses on the role of national parties with an extreme position on the 
left-right dimension in increasing the salience of the EU. Others mainly see populist right-
wing parties as the drivers of the increasing salience of the EU for citizens (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009; Hutter and Grande 2014). Oppermann (2008) also argues that political elites try 
to defuse or intensify the salience of the EU for public opinion in the United Kingdom. The 
salience that political issues have for citizens, in turn, has been seen as having broad effects 
for political processes. Low-salience of EU issues, for example, may explain low turnout in 
European Parliament elections (Clark 2014). Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that the 
increasing salience of and increasing conflict over the European integration process has led to 
a slowing down of the integration process. 
Salience also plays a large role in the interest group literature. Rasmussen et al. (2014) 
show that interest groups are most likely to mobilize on issues that are of high salience to 
citizens. Interest groups, in turn, have been shown to play a key role in shaping the public 
salience of issues (Dür and Mateo 2015). While some issues may inherently be more likely to 
attract broad public attention, interest groups can help make a potentially salient issue into an 
actually salient issue. A common argument in this literature is also that on issues of high 
public salience, interest groups, and in particular business actors, tend to be less influential 
than on issues of low public salience (Mahoney 2007; Culpepper 2011; Woll 2012; Dür and 
Mateo 2014; Rasmussen 2014). Focusing on salience to interest groups, Klüver (2011) shows 
that high salience increases the influence of actors that form part of the relatively larger 
lobbying coalition on an issue and decreases the influence of actors that belong to the smaller 
coalition. Still other research on interest groups shows how these actors try to shape the public 
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salience of issues, for example by making use of media-related strategies (Beyers 2004; 
Chalmers 2013; Dür and Mateo 2015). 
The literature on media reporting on the EU also heavily relies on the concept of 
salience. Much of this literature studies how important the EU is for media outlets relative to 
other topics. Generally, these studies indicate that the salience of the EU for media is low 
(Meyer 1999; Kevin 2003: 124; Peter et al. 2003). In their analysis of newspapers, Kriesi and 
his colleagues find that in the 1970s, 1990s and in the 2000s the space devoted to European 
integration issues proper by newspapers in six countries varied between 2.3 percent and 7.8 
percent with no clear trend (Kriesi et al. 2012: 110). In their analysis of media reports on the 
European Parliament (EP) elections 2009 in 27 EU member states Schunck et al., however, 
show that media attention and the public visibility of EP election go up, if parties contest on 
EU policies and the future direction of the integration process (2011). The reasons provided 
for this low EU media salience are the underdeveloped media landscape, the complex 
institutional structure of the EU – which makes it difficult for journalist to locate the 
institutional ownership of issues – and the fact that the technically complex nature of many 
EU policies makes it difficult to identify the immediate human interest.  
Finally, salience is a prominent concept in the legislative and party politics literatures. 
It plays a particularly prominent role in accounts which model collective decision-making as 
exchanges, such as bargaining and log rolling models. The dynamics and outcomes of 
collective decision-making is driven by the varying levels of salience which decision-makers 
attribute to a specific issue, since they allow actors to make compromises and to arrive at an 
agreement (Arregui et al. 2006; Thomson 2011: 234). It has been argued and empirically 
demonstrated that the effect of salience on actors’ influence on a decision outcome can work 
in two distinct directions. For one, policy-makers that attach high importance to an issue 
might be more willing to make compromises, and thus “lose” influence on its outcome, to 
increase the likelihood of the adoption of the decision (Schneider et al. 2010: 92, 97). 
Alternatively, decision-makers who attach high salience to a specific issue will invest 
considerable political resources to influence it according to their own preferences and 
interests (Thomson 2011: 234, 248).  
Warntjen (2007: 1142-1143), moreover, shows that the salience attached to a policy 
area by a government, measured by the government parties’ party manifestoes and political 
speeches, affect how it steers the Council’s agenda during its presidency. Wonka (2015) 
shows that during their parliamentary debates of Euro crisis measures, political parties in the 
German Bundestag have tried to influence the dynamics of the general political debate in their 
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own political interest by manipulating the salience of different – economic, cultural, 
institutional – aspects of the crisis. In addition, Wonka and Rittberger (2014: 637) show that 
the level of salience which German MPs attribute to EU integration strongly affects the 
supranational and transnational ties they activate to engage in EU politics. Leuffen et al. 
(2014), finally, explain salience in EU legislative decision-making at the country level and 
show that the political salience of specific legislative cases is strongly related to domestic 
interest group politics. 
Across these various strands of literature, salience has been measured in a myriad of 
ways. Studies dealing with EU salience to citizens mainly measure this concept via public 
opinion polls (e.g. De Vries 2007). De Vries (2007), for example, used questions about 
citizens’ perceptions of the most important problems facing their countries (but see Wlezien 
2005 for a critique of this approach). Oppermann (2008) relied on a question about the “most 
important issue facing Britain today.” Clark (2014) used data from a Eurobarometer question 
on why people do not participate in the elections to the European Parliament, which contained 
response categories such as “not interested in EU affairs” and “EP’s issues do not concern 
me” that are indicative of EU salience. Since public opinion data is often missing for more 
specific issues dealt with by the EU, Dür and Mateo (2015) used Google Trends data to 
examine their argument.2 Google Trends provides data on the relative frequencies with which 
people use specific search terms on Google. Hurrelmann et al. (2013), finally, used focus 
groups with 8 to 10 participants to get a grasp of the salience of different EU-related issues. 
Studies of interest groups, lobbying and representation used interview questions 
asking lobbyists about the salience they attach to specific issues (Laumann and Knoke 1987; 
Tatham 2012; ). Alternative measures used in this literature are the amount of resources 
interest groups dedicate to an issue or the number of groups that mobilize on a specific issue. 
The media salience of an issue has been measured by counting the number of newspaper 
articles or news reports dealing with that issue. But also the length, positioning etcetera of the 
articles or news reports can say something about the salience of an issue for the media. 
Finally, salience to policy-makers has been measured by relying on parliamentary debates, 
party manifestoes, expert judgements and media reports (Green-Pedersen 2012; De Bruycker 
and Beyers 2015; Rauh 2014; Wonka 2015). In terms of parliamentary debates, the more time 
MPs dedicate to a topic, the greater its salience can be expected to be. Similarly, how much 
space parties dedicate to an issue in their manifestoes can be an indicator of the salience of 
                                                          
2 www.google.com/trends.  
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that issue for the party. Other studies have assessed the salience of proposals via media 
reports, aspects of the legislative texts produced or procedural data (see Warntjen 2011: 170).  
 
Establishing conceptual boundaries and improving measurement validity 
Broad consensus exists across the various strands of literature discussed above that 
salience is best understood as the relative importance - i.e. in comparison to other matters – 
actors attribute to a specific political matter (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Laver 
2001: 69-71; Thomson 2011: 234, Warntjen 2011). The “political matter” that is the object of 
salience can be broad, for example European integration as such, or very specific, as for 
example individual EU policies, a policy domain or a particular political event. While 
agreement exists on this basic definition, several aspects of the usage of the concept in these 
literatures are problematic. First, although the definition puts emphasis on actors, many 
studies do not specify for whom a specific political issue or object is salient or not. This is 
problematic because political salience may vary across actor types. For example, what is 
salient for interest groups might not be salient for the citizenry at large. Second, the definition 
makes clear that salience is a state of mind rather than something that may or may not matter 
for political behaviour. Nevertheless, most empirical measures of salience are behavioural. 
Third, many studies that use salience as a predictor to explain specific outcomes fail to pay 
attention to the fact that salience is dynamic. Actors often try to manipulate – either increase 
or decrease – the salience of an issue for specific audiences through their actions. Salience is 
thus (partly) endogenous to political practices. We discuss these issues in turn. 
 
First, the actor-centered conceptualization of salience asks for the specification of the 
actor(s) whose salience assessments shall be captured. In principle we can assess salience 
assessments of individual actors or a collective of one type of actors or to all actors in a 
political territory. An issue that enjoys high salience among citizens of a country or a 
particular interest group community may still be of limited salience for a specific citizen or a 
specific interest group. Or, an issue might imply a very important problem for one single actor 
or a relatively small set of actors, but is hardly salient for other actors. Interest groups, for 
example, often lobby on niche issues that can be expected to be highly salient to a small 
number of actors but of little importance to most interest groups or the broader public (on 
lobbying on niche issues, see Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  
Moreover, the salience of an issue may vary across general types of actors, namely 
citizens, interest groups, and policy-makers. It is plausible that most issues that are of high 
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salience to citizens also are of high salience to interest groups and policy-makers. Especially 
for policy-makers, the stakes are high on issues of high public salience, as elections may be 
won or lost on such issues. It is thus plausible that public salience implies salience for policy-
makers. At the same time, many issues that are highly salient to (certain) interest groups may 
be of little importance to citizens or policy-makers. This is epitomized by the concept of 
“special” interests that have a high stake in specific issues. These issues are of high salience to 
these interest groups but exhibit low public salience and possibly also low salience for policy-
makers.  
In short, although the case for specifying salience for whom thus is clear-cut, the 
existing literature often just refers to the salience of an issue without carefully specifying for 
whom an issue is salient. Keeping salience for citizens, salience for interest groups and 
salience for policy-makers distinct not only is important for conceptual reasons, but also as 
doing so allows for an empirical investigation into the dynamic nature of salience (e.g. 
whether public opinion shapes salience among policy-makers) and how the salience of issues 
varies (or not) across different types of actors. 
 
Second, it is important to recognize that salience is a cognitive concept, that is, it 
refers to perception rather than behaviour. Directly, one way to assess actor-based salience 
assessments is through interviews by asking stakeholders about the salience they attach to 
specific issues. Yet, interview projects are demanding and very often impractical. For 
example, problems of recollection if events lie far back in time or research on a large number 
of actors may make it impossible to rely on interviews to measure salience. Illustratively, 
measuring the public salience of specific issues via public opinion polls is too expensive. 
Very often, therefore, research relies on behavioural indicators such as the number of interest 
groups active on an issue or the amount of media reporting as proxy measures for salience. 
This is problematic because the observed behaviour might reflect, but is not conceptually 
equivalent to salience. Moreover, our knowledge of how salience affects behaviour and which 
strategic and contextual factors matter for how salience is translated into behaviour is limited. 
Some behavioural measures of salience thus might reflect actors’ willingness to invest 
political resources to influence political outcomes rather than cognition or the salience actors 
attribute to a policy. All behavioural measures of salience hence contain considerable (and 
possibly systematic) noise which needs to be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
results and when drawing conclusions. 
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Illustratively, using conflict as an indicator of salience is potentially problematic. It is 
plausible that a positive relationship between conflict and salience exists, but conceptually 
these two terms are different. While conflict captures the contestation between political actors 
that results from different views and positions on a subject, salience is the possibly varying 
importance attributed to this subject by different actors. A number of actors can all consider 
an issue to be of low importance, but they might not hold different views on the issue. 
Conflict thus can be high on issues that exhibit low salience. Alternatively, many actors can 
all consider an issue to be of high salience, without holding conflicting positions. A natural 
disaster, for example, can be of high salience without there being conflict.  
In fact, the relationship between conflict and salience is complex. First, conflict may 
induce actors to alter their assessments of the relative importance of political objects. That is, 
the causal chain may go from conflict to salience. Second, the causal relationship can also 
work the other way round. If an issue is salient to actors, they might be willing to enter 
conflict with other actors during an election campaign or when a decision on a policy is taken. 
Third, an actor that attributes high salience to an object may have little interest in and avoid 
political contestation, because she expects her own political power to be negatively affected 
by conflict. Mainstream political parties which occupy the ideological centre are a case in 
point, as they tried to suppress the public salience of the EU issue in order not to allow EU-
critical fringe parties advantages in electoral competition (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). 
Given the potentially complex relationship between conflict and salience, more careful 
conceptual thinking and better empirical research is needed in order to learn under which 
conditions conflict can be used as proxy for salience. 
A further complication that arises is that quite regularly we cannot observe behaviour 
or the results of it directly, but have to rely on media reports on political events and conflicts. 
Media outlets report observed behaviour and select those actions, statements and actors they 
consider to be newsworthy and important. Any salience measure for individual actors derived 
from media reports is therefore influenced by both the behavioural component and media 
selection effects. Conceptually and empirically, media measures of political activities are 
therefore quite different from the actor-centred and cognitive conceptualization of salience we 
propose here. It is therefore not so surprising that research on political parties found that 
actor-centred measures of salience obtained through party manifestoes, expert surveys or 
voter surveys are not systematically related with media measures that are meant to capture the 
salience that political parties attribute to different political issues and policy domains 
(Helbling and Tresch 2011: 180-181). 
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In this paper we hence reserve the concept of media attention, rather than (issue) 
salience (Hutter and Grande 2014; Helbing and Tresch 2011), for the extent to which media 
reports on the actions and statements of different political actors. This is conceptually and 
empirically closer to what is actually being measured and it helps to draw the analytically 
important boundary between an actor’s assessment of the relative importance of different 
political objects and the visibility this actor’s behaviour gets through media reports. Attention 
is also conceptually closer to what media based empirical studies investigate: the publicly 
visible contestation of different actors on different political issues and the relative prominence 
that different thematic aspects get in these. The public visibility of these conflicts, which is 
facilitated by media reports, also makes attention an important element in studies on the 
politicization of the EU, which deal with the increasing and open, i.e. publicly visible, 
contestation on the future course of the European Union (de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Hooghe 
and Marks 2009; Hutter and Grande 2014).    
 
Finally, when using the concept of salience, it is important to recognize that the causal 
role of salience in public policy analysis is complex. This is so because not only salience 
affects behaviour, but also political practices shape salience. Illustratively, the public salience 
of issues has been shown to affect interest group mobilization (Rasmussen et al. 2014). At the 
same time, interest group mobilization can affect the public salience at least of some issues 
(Dür and Mateo 2014, 2015). This endogeneity of salience is also illustrated by the fact that 
Leuffen et al. (2014) explain variation in salience across states; and Thomson (2011) uses 
variation in salience across states to explain bargaining outcomes. Yet, although actor 
properties and contextual variables are not so easy to separate analytically as the salience 
experienced by an individual actor results from contextual experiences (see Klüver et al. 
2015), many analyses consider salience as some exogenous explanatory factor (for voting 
behaviour, political mobilization, implementation).  
In the empirical section of this paper we will explore the empirical plausibility of the 
conceptual considerations on salience which we outlined in the previous paragraphs along 
various lines: First, to empirically substantiate our claim that it is important to conceptually 
differentiate salience attributions of different types and collectives of actors, we will 
investigate to which extent and how decision-makers’, interest groups’ and citizens’ salience 
assessments of concrete EU policies co-vary in decision-making on about 100 EU legislative 
proposals. Second, to investigate the relationship between indicators that are close to our 
cognitive conceptualization of salience and behavioural proxies of salience, we will explore 
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the empirical relationship between cognitive and behavioural measures of salience. Moreover, 
we will use media reports on the already mentioned policy-making processes to investigate 
how different indicators of salience are related to the concept of attention we briefly 
introduced above. Finally, we will look at the salience of specific EU legislative proposals to 
assess the dynamic nature of salience. Before we come to the empirical analyses, we will 
introduce the data we use for our investigation.    
 
Research design and data 
The unique contribution of this paper is that we combine a large number of measures 
that capture different aspects of salience in relation to 125 legislative cases. The data used for 
answering our research questions are part of the larger INTEREURO project, which analyses 
lobbying strategies and interest group influence for a stratified sample of 125 European 
Commission legislative proposals (directives and regulations) that were submitted between 
2008 and 2010. To select politically contested EU legislative proposals, we relied on their 
coverage by five news sources (Agence Europe, European Voice, the Financial Times, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Le Monde) (for a detailed discussion of the sampling 
strategy, see Beyers et al. 2014a; Beyers et al. 2014b).3  
About two-thirds of all submitted proposals for directives and 60 per cent of the 
proposals for regulations were mentioned at least once in one media source. We use two 
media hits as the threshold for cases to enter our sample. In this way we randomly selected the 
48 proposals for directives and 38 proposals for regulations that were mentioned. Note that 
this low threshold introduces large variation in media attention across proposals in our 
sample. To add additional variation in terms of media attention, we added a randomly selected 
set of 10 proposals for directives and 9 proposals for regulations that did not meet the media 
coverage criterion. Finally, we added all proposals for directives and regulations that had not 
made it into the sample following that strategy, but for which the EC held public consultations 
and consultation documents are available. We did this for pragmatic reasons, as we wanted to 
benefit from the additional data that is available for consultation cases and as this enables us 
to control for the extent to which lobbying through consultations can be seen as a signal of 
political salience. 
                                                          
3 Using some non-English-language media sources was important to avoid a bias in our sample towards 
proposals of specific interest to some countries and to identify cases that are particularly important at the national 
level. 
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We used these media sources not only at the sampling stage, but also to arrive at 
empirical measures of media attention for each legislative proposal in our sample. For the 
purpose of this paper, we focus on three EU-media sources (Agence Europe, European Voice 
and EurActive). We identified all articles that were written on each of the 125 proposals 
(between 2008 and 2010). Our first measure of media attention is the number of articles. Our 
next step consisted of a more fine-grained analysis of the media coverage. We used the news 
reports to identify all stakeholders (public and private) which were reported to be politically 
active in the respective decision-making process together with the statements these actors 
were reported to have made. Statements are quotes made by interest group officials, 
government officials, politicians, or other stakeholders that can be directly linked to one of the 
sampled proposals (see De Bruycker and Beyers 2015). For the purpose of this paper we 
developed four distinct variables which count the number of media statements made by 1) 
interest group officials, 2) Commission officials, 3) MEPs or representatives of EP party 
groups and 4) national government representatives. Each of these distinct measures covers the 
media attention in relation to a specific type of stakeholder.  
We also looked at how salient the different topics covered by the 125 legislative cases 
were to the broader public. In the absence of a more direct measure of the salience of the 
proposals in our sample to citizens, we used data from the 2009 European Election Study to 
get an understanding of which policy areas may have been salient to the public at large (EES 
2009). In that study, respondents across the EU were asked what they think the “[second, 
third] most important problem facing” their country was. We mapped the responses to these 
questions to the proposals in our sample by coding both using the codebook of the EU policy 
agendas project (Alexandrova et al. 2013). For each policy area, we calculated the weighted 
percentage of respondents across the EU that mentioned this area as the first, second or third 
most important problem. We then took the natural log of this value as a measure of the 
relative public salience of the policy areas that the various proposals form part of. 
Moreover, two sets of interviews provide us with indicators of salience to interest 
groups. First, we interviewed 95 policy experts in the European Commission. Next, these 
interviews with EC experts were followed by 143 interviews with EU-level interest group 
officials who were closely involved in lobbying with regard to these legislative cases (for 
more details on these interviewing projects see Beyers et al. 2014c). These 143 interviews 
were conducted with officials from 111 different interest organizations; some organizations 
were interviewed multiple times because they were involved in more than one case. The 
interviews with EC-experts covered 70 proposals. Through the interviews with interest group 
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officials, we covered 85 proposals. The interviews were meant to map the entire range of 
interests that actively tried to influence the policy outcomes, to measure the divisiveness by 
identifying the different policy positions, and to assess the lobbying strategies these mobilized 
interests adopted.  
The interviews were preceded by considerable research, including short telephone 
interviews on each case, so that the most relevant informant could be identified and contacted 
for an interview. One of the most important reasons why we did not interview EC experts or 
interest groups officials on all 125 cases is because our pre-research showed that 37 cases 
showed almost no lobbying activities (see below).4 Business associations make up the largest 
part (64 percent) of our interest group respondents, another 29 percent represent NGOs and 
the remaining 8 percent are officials from professional organizations, firms or labour unions. 
Through the careful mapping of media coverage and the expert interviews with EC-
officials and organized interests we could identify the set of stakeholders who actively lobbied 
on each legislative case. This resulted in one variable which simply measures the extent of 
lobbying or interest group mobilization for each piece of legislation. In addition, we have, for 
each proposal the number of organized interests who submitted position papers in those 
instances when the European Commission held public consultations. Based on the interviews 
with interest group officials we could develop two – one cognitive and one behavioural – 
actor-centred measures of salience. First, we asked in relation to 443 conflictive issues that 
were contained in the sampled proposals ‘Thinking about all the issues you have been 
engaged in during the past four years, could you say for each of the issues mentioned above 
whether it was: highly important (1), somewhat important (2), or not so important (3) for 
your organization?’ Next, we probed into the behavioural aspect by asking ‘Comparing all 
the issues you have engaged with during the past four years, for each issue characterizing this 
particular proposal, were your organisation’s efforts at shaping the legislative outcome more 
than average (1), about average (2), or less than average (3)?’ These are relative measures, 
namely each time the respondent is asked to compare a particular topic in relation to other 
topics that are relevant within the organization. As we have often multiple interviews and 
issues per proposals we created two variables which for each proposal capture the share of 
responses that the issue was more important or demanded efforts compared to the total 
number of issues that were at stake in one proposal. The higher the share of more 
important/demanding issues, the higher the actor-centred salience of a particular proposal. 
                                                          
4 Another 9 proposals were dropped because no interest groups could be convinced to cooperate on these 
proposals or nobody within the organization had a memory of the specific proposal they were selected for. 
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In the interviews with Commission officials, we asked them to indicate how frequently 
interest groups used a series of strategies to influence the European Commission’s policy 
position with regard to a specific proposal. The tactic that we rely upon as behavioural 
measure of salience to interest groups in this paper is directly lobbying towards the European 
Commission. Respondents could indicate that the strategy was not used at all (1), used less 
frequently than on other proposals that they were familiar with (2), used about as frequently 
(3), or used more frequently (4).  
 
Table 1: Variables and salience indicators 
Variable Type of 
indicator 
Level of 
aggregation 
Summary statistics 
N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Salience indicators for: citizens 
Awareness (logged) cognitive collective 125 1.98 1.28 0.00 1.81 4.47 
Salience indicators for: interest groups 
Proposal salience cognitive individual 90 0.44 0.36 0.00 0.50 1.00 
Resources spent behavioural individual 90 0.37 0.36 0.00 0.31 1.00 
Consultation 
submissions (logged) behavioural collective 57 4.08 1.17 1.61 4.16 7.38 
Lobbying activity 
vis-à-vis COM behavioural collective 67 3.22 0.79 1 3 4 
Number of groups 
that mobilized behavioural collective 125 13.62 13.34 0 11 85 
Salience indicators for: decision-makers 
Recitals – final act behavioural collective 115 35.18 28.03 2 27 195 
Consultation submis-
sions governments 
(logged) 
behavioural collective 57 1.38 1.48 0.00 0.69 3.78 
Voting abstention in 
European Parliament behavioural collective 103 29.60 28.69 0 21 178 
Media “attention” indicators  
Total number of 
media articles behavioural collective 125 9.02 9.69 0 6 48 
Media statements by 
interest groups behavioural collective  125 6.63 9.34 0 3 47 
Media statements by 
Commission behavioural collective  125 4.98 6.35 0 3 33 
Media statements by 
Members of EP behavioural collective  125 5.73 11.51 0 2 
87 
 
Media statements by 
governments behavioural collective  125 6.86 13.02 0 3 88 
 
Finally, we have a number of measures which account for the salience policy-makers 
attach to a specific piece of legislation. First, we counted the number of recitals that precedes 
the text of each legislative proposal in our sample to set out the main reason or justification 
for the act. The more recitals, so we assume in line with some studies (Warntjen 2012), the 
more salient an act is. Next, we counted the number of abstentions in EP voting on the final 
act, whereby the presumption is that in the case of salient issues, MEPs would refrain from 
abstentions. Finally, in addition to the media statements made by different types of decision-
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makers (see above), we developed a count variable assessing the number of position papers 
member-state government agencies and EU institutions submitted during public consultations.  
 
Empirical analysis 
We start our analyses with an empirical exploration of the extent to and the way in 
which the different dimensions of the salience concept that we introduced above are 
empirically related. In our analytical section, we distinguished three types of actors – citizens, 
interest groups and decision-makers – and the media. We claimed that it is important to 
analytically distinguish these actors and venues for empirical as well as conceptual reasons. 
To empirically probe our analytical claims, we conducted an explorative factor analysis. 
Factor analysis is a multivariate and data reduction technique which allows discovering 
systematic patterns between a set of variables. The extent to which individual variables “load” 
on the different factors, i.e. the extent to which they are systematically related to it, provides 
information on the structure underlying the set of variables included in the factor analysis. If 
our conceptual considerations are correct, we would expect the different salience indicators 
for interest groups, decision-makers and citizens as well as the indicators for media attention 
to strongly correlate amongst each other and to load on the same factors. Yet, given the 
dynamic nature of salience, we do not exclude cross-loading, namely the fact that some 
variables possibly load on multiple factors, for instance because one could expect that media 
attention or citizen awareness triggers actor-centred salience among lobbyists. 
We ran the factor analysis on 14 variables. Because of missing observations (in the 
current version of the dataset) for some variables, the N for the factor analysis is 36. The most 
important reasons for our large drop-out is that in the current analysis we did not consider 
cases where no public consultations were held as we considered it not entirely appropriate to 
impute some value for these ‘missing’ cases.5 There are a number of criteria to decide on the 
number of factors to extract. Based on the “Kaiser criterion”, namely the number of 
components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, we extracted four factors. This choice is 
backed up by a scree plot that shows a marked flattening of the curve at four components. We 
relied on orthogonal Varimax rotation, which assumes independence of factors. Oblimin 
rotation, which allows factors to be correlated, produces very similar results. The share of 
variance that we explain with the four factors is 0.61.  
                                                          
5 We also implemented some alternative models leaving out the variables on public consultations or models 
where we imputed a 0 for the missing consultation cases. The outcomes of these models are largely similar to 
what we report in this paper.  
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Table 2 presents the factor loadings that we receive for the various variables included 
in the model. The results lend considerable support to our conceptual considerations, namely 
that political salience on a particular set of topics has multiple dimensions that can 
analytically be distinguished from each other.  
 
Table 2: Factor loadings 
Variables 
Factor 1 
(media 
attention) 
Factor 2 
(interest 
groups) 
Factor 3 
(policy 
makers) 
Factor 4 
 
 
Media attention     
Total number of articles 0.94  0.31  
Media statements IGs 0.49   0.58 
Media statements MEPs 0.53  0.73  
Media statements Council 0.53  0.84  
Media statements Commission 0.97    
Interest group salience     
Proposal salience  0.88   
Resources spent  0.90  0.30 
Number of groups mobilized 0.48 0.41   
Lobbying of Commission  0.61   
Consultation submissions     
Salience for policy-makers     
Abstentions   0.53  
Consultation submissions gvts.   0.44  
Recitals – final act 0.64 0.30   
Salience for citizens     
Awareness    -0.36 
Note: we only show loadings equal or larger than 0.3 or equal or smaller than -0.3.  
 
Factor 1 captures all media indicators. In our conceptual discussion we argued that 
media indicators such as the number of articles in itself do not indicate salience (while in 
many studies these are often used as indicators for salience) but measure media attention. 
However, both media indicators and two of our indicators for salience to policy-makers load 
on Factor 3, pointing at a positive relationship between media attention and political salience. 
The fact that an increasing number of articles corresponds with more public statements by all 
actor types underpins the robustness of the claim that media attention correlates with 
saliences. This is also substantiated by the fact that media attention correlates with the total 
number of groups that lobby as well as the final number of recitals. Yet, the correlation of 
media indicators with the factor varies and it is below 0.5 for interest group statements (0.49), 
while the final number of recitals, a salience indicator for decision-makers, shows a loading of 
0.64. The fact that the final number of recitals correlates considerably with the media 
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indicators does, however, make sense: a higher number of recitals is likely an indicator of 
greater conflict on a proposal, making it more interesting also for journalists (De Bruycker 
and Beyers 2015). The number of groups mobilized also loads strongly on this factor.  
Factor 2 captures almost all indicators for salience to interest groups. Again, however, 
the extent to which the indicators correlate with the factor varies. It is particularly high for 
Proposal salience and Resources spent, but somewhat lower for the total number of groups 
that mobilized (0.41). Moreover, the number of submissions by interest groups to the 
Commission’s online consultations does not correlate systematically with this factor. 
Interestingly, this variable does not load highly on any of the four factors, indicating that it 
may not be the best measure of the political salience of EU legislative proposals. The fact that 
individual groups’ salience assessment of the proposal, the political resources they spent on 
lobbying the respective proposal and the lobbying of the EC strongly correlates with factor 2, 
while the factor loadings are smaller for the measures of collective salience to interest groups 
gives plausibility to our distinction above between individual and collective indicators of 
salience.  
Two indicators of salience to decision-makers load highly on factor 3, as do several of 
the measures of media attention. Interestingly, and this provides support for our argument 
about variation across types of actors, the media measures that do load highly on factor 3 are 
again related to policy-makers: media statements by MEPs and media statements by 
governments. Clearly, then, these measures of media attention are good measures of salience 
to policy-makers, but less indicative for the actor-centered salience.  
Factor 4, finally, can be conceived as a residual category, with two measures of 
salience to interest groups – resource spending and media attention - loading highly on it. 
Interestingly, this factor also is the opposite of what our public salience measure captures, as 
indicated by the negative loading for this variable. That the public salience variable does not 
load more highly on any of the four factors may also be due to the fact that our measure is 
very crude. The fact that our public salience measure has no relation to any of the other 
factors and loads negatively on this one suggests that there is potentially a discrepancy 
between what is sensitive to the broader public and what goes on in Brussels. However, we 
would need public opinion data on the actual proposals in our sample to make a more 
confident judgment about how public salience relates to the other measures of salience in our 
dataset.  
Overall, the factor analysis lends support to our conceptual argument that we need to 
be analytically clear about the type of actor we refer to when discussing and measuring 
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salience. Factors 1, 2 and 3 show strong loadings mostly of salience indicators for the media, 
interest groups and policy-makers, respectively. A crude measure of overall media attention 
such as the number of newspaper articles published on a proposal thus is not a good indicator 
of salience to either interest groups or policy-makers. Of course, this does not mean that 
topics that gain a lot of media attention are not salient to interest groups or decision-makers, 
but it implies that quite a number of topics which do not gain media attention are potentially 
salient to individual actors. Probably these are the issues on which media attention is low and 
where advocates aim to increase or prevent media attention. Further analysis is needed in 
order to shed more light on this. Second, at the same time the boundaries between the 
different categories and the media are not absolutely clear-cut as some of the indicators we 
relied upon in our analysis correlate considerably across types. This, however, is hardly 
surprising. We have argued above that it is very likely to expect systematic relationships 
across actor types and the media and called for an empirical investigation of these. The 
relationship is particularly strong between media attention and salience of proposals for 
decision-makers as indicators of both load highly on factor 3.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper tried to achieve two goals, namely 1) conceptualizing the concept ‘political 
salience’ and 2) exploring a substantial number of measures that might be used in order to 
assess salience.  
Our conceptual discussion on salience started with a broad review of different 
branches of literature – media studies, public opinion, legislative politics and interest group 
politics – that makes extensive use of this concept. In addition to the fact that the concept is 
poorly specified, we observed that usually scholars use indirect behavioral measures in order 
to capture what in our view is essentially a cognitive concept. For instance, scholars rely on 
aggregate media-analyses as a basis for inferences on how individual actors think and behave. 
We don’t suggest that all the studies that use salience as a key concept are wrong or flawed. 
With our discussion we hope to contribute to a more careful usage of this concept. Instead of 
using salience as a generic concept, we would like to advise scholars to carefully distinguish 
between  the varying levels of salience attributed to political topics or decisions by different 
types of actors, to think more about the cognitive and behavioral dimension of salience when 
conceptualizing and operationalizing salience, and finally to analytically separate whether we 
deal with actor- or individual salience or collective salience. We see our conceptual 
discussion as a start for further methodological and conceptual reflection in this area.  
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Next we discussed various salience measures and we explored empirically the 
relationship between these and the extent to which different dimensions of salience can and 
should be analytically distinguished. The unique contribution of our project is that we 
developed a large array of salience measures which enable us to carry out this analysis. Yet, 
some caveats are in place. First, although we emphasized the cognitive aspect of salience as 
well as the importance of an actor-centered approach, we need to admit that we, in addition to 
some actor-centered and cognitive measures largely rely on – as most other research in this 
area – behavioral and collective measures. Second, it needs to be stressed that our results are 
preliminary findings and that much more work – both in terms of data-analysis and theoretical 
reflection – needs to be done in order to fine-tune our insights.  
Nonetheless, our preliminary and explorative analyses lead to some results which are 
worth mentioning. First of all, the media attention concrete policy topics gain seems to be 
somewhat different from other salience measures, which is interesting as media analyses are 
often used when measuring salience. This does not mean that media-analysis cannot be used, 
but the crude counting of media hits or articles is probably not sufficient. Interesting, more 
fine-grained media-measures – such as statements made by interest groups or statements 
made by policy makers – seem to correlate better with behavioral salience measures that 
concern a particular type of actors. Sure, media analyses will help to uncover a substantial set 
of visible and salient topics, but it will miss salient topics where a substantial number of 
stakeholders were unsuccessfully seeking media attention or tried to avoid public visibility. 
Second, the easy access to formal consultations is tempting for researchers (who as always 
lack time and resources), but based on our results we would caution against an uncritical 
usage of consultation documents. It is not that consultation documents cannot be used – they 
should be used – but the density of participation in consultation is probably not the best proxy 
for cognitive and actor-centered salience. Finally, although our data on public opinion and the 
topics we cover in our data-set are not as precise as we would like to have them, it is telling 
that we could not observe any correlation between broad public salience and attention in (EU-
level) media sources or the other measures of salience. Of course, as always, more research is 
needed, but this observation confirms the image of two worlds, namely what is sensitive to the 
broader public and what is going on in Brussels.  
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